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NOTES AND COMMENTS

reduces the plaintiff's recovery to the extent his injuries have been
aggravated by his own antecedent negligence1 s
In the principal case, there are obvious difficulties in apportioning
physical and mental suffering and medical expense. Such difficulties
are not insuperable. They are no greater than apportionment upon
the basis of potential damage from one cause, which reduces the loss
inflicted by another. 19 Each apportionment case, however, must turn
on its own particular facts.
Logic and consistency m the principal case demand an apportionment of damages. A correct instruction as to damages might have
resulted in a smaller verdict. A retrial should have been granted on
2
the issue of damages. 0

TRADE REGULATION
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AND THE
SHERMAN ACT
Four affiliated General Motors Corporations and seventeen individuals were prosecuted, under Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, for conspiring to restrain interstate trade and commerce in
General Motors automobiles. The alleged purpose of the conspiracy
was to compel General Motors dealers to use General Motors Acceptance Corporation financing in their purchases and sales of automobiles.
The purpose was stated to have been accomplished by cancelling the
franchises of dealers who refused to use the financing, by favoring
dealers who used the finance service, in the matter of deliveries of
automobiles and other appropriate means. A jury in the District
Court acquitted the individual defendants and found the four corporate defendants guilty. Judgment entered upon verdict fining each
corporate defendant $5000. Held, affirmed on appeal.'
The defendants contended that, since they were affiliated noncompeting corporations, any restraint by them of the interstate commerce in their own automobiles was not prohibited by the Sherman
Act.2 The title to the automobiles usually passes to the dealers before
shipment and the commerce which was restrained was the commerce
Is Notes (1938) 22 MINN. L. REV. 410, (1930) 66 A.LR. 1121, 1135,
(1930) 30 col. L. REV. 268.
19Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 85 N.H. 449, 216 Atl.
111 (1932); See Peaslee, Multiple Causation & Damage (1934)
47 HARV. L. REV. 1127. See also, Felter v. Delaware & Hudson
R.R., 19 F. Supp. 825 (1937), aff'd 98 F. (2d) 868 (C.C.A. 3d,
1938) (damage for only portion of total value), (1937) 12 TEMPLE
LQ. 132.
2oK0ummer Motor Bua & Taxi Co. v. Mech. Lumber Co., 175 Ark. 750,
300 S.W. 399; May Dep't Stores Co. v. Bell, 61 F. (2d) 83 (C.C.A.
8th, 1932) (issues of retrial limited to damages).
I United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. (2d) 376 (C.C.A. 7th,
1941), cert. dented, 10 u.sj WE= 3113.
2 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1934).
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of the dealers. 3 A manufacturer may refuse to sell his goods and
not violate the Sherman Act. 4 However, he can not do so by combination or conspiracy with his agents and customers. 5 Thus a conspiracy
between distributors of copyrighted films, not to lease films to a certain dealer was within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.6 This
is true though each of the individuals concerned might have refused to
lease, without liability, if not done in concert with others.7
The purpose of the restraint in the instant case was to coerce
the dealers into using General Motors Acceptance Corporation financing.
Financing is not a commerce. 8 Transactions not interstate commerce
but which burden and obstruct such commerce are subject to Federal
regulation. 9 And local sales occurring in the course of the flow of interstate commerce are subject to Federal control.' 0
The Government drew an apt analogy between the facts in the
principal case and those us the tying clause cases.", In the tying
clause cases one who had a monopoly, by patent or otherwise, in one
article would refuse to sell it unless the purchaser would also buy other
goods at the same time. In several cases enforcement of tying clauses
3 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911)
(manufacturer need not sell, but having sold, he can not place
restrictions upon the purchaser).
4 Arthur v. Kraft Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824, (D. Md. 1938).
Trader can withhold his goods from one who will not sell them at
prices which trader fixes for resale. United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Hill Bros. v. F.T.C., 9 F. (2d) 481
(C.C.A. 9th, 1926). Manufacturer may refuse to sell to persons
who continue to handle competitor's product. Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454 (C.C.A. 8th, 1903).
5 Hill Bros. v. F.T.C., 9 F. (2d) 481 (C.C.A. 9th, 1926).
6
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291 (1923); accord, Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600 (1914).
7

See note 6 supra.

sHemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928); Blumenstock Bros. v.
Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U.S. 436 (1920); Nathan v. Louisiana, 8
How. 73 (U.S. 1850).
9
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Local
167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934); Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927);
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925);
Wisconsin v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922); Houston,
E. & W.T. Ry. v. United States (the Shreveport Case) 234 U.S.
342 (1914), Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
1OBoard of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923); Stafford v. Wallace,
258 U.S. 495 (1922); Lemke v. Farmer's Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50
(1922); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
"International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S.
131 (1936); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp. 283 U.S. 27
(1931); United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S.
451 (1922); F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920); United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917);
Radio Corp. v. Lord, 28 F (2d) 257 (C.C.A. 3d, .1928).
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in contracts or leases has been enjoined as violating the Clayton Act.' 2
Tying clauses which are necessary to protect manufacturer's good
will do not violate the Clayton Act.' 3 But in the principal case, it is
difficult to see how manufacturer's good will could be served by
restricting the financing to that furnished by General Motors Acceptance Corporation.
In a suit instituted by the Government, under the Sherman Act,
to enjoin restrictive covenants and tying clauses in leases of patented
machinery, the injunctive relief was refused.1 4 The court held that a
patent conferred a complete monopoly, that it could not be made more
extensive by a contract of the patentee, and that such a monopoly
was not within the prohibition of the Sherman Act.15 The Government
later instituted a suit against the same restrictive covenants and tying
clauses under the Clayton Act.'6 This suit was successful on the ground
that the Act contained the express words "whether patented or unpatented."' 7 That General Motors automobiles are largely covered
by patents was a point not raised on the trial. Upon the authority
of the First Shoe Machinery Company Case,'8 a prosecution of a "tying
clause" in connection with a patented article must fail if brought under
the Sherman Act. But that case, though never expressly overruled
might now be if the point were again squarely presented. 19
The defendants insisted that their sole purpose in organizing
General Motors Acceptance Corporation was to increase the sale of
their automobiles and that any restraint which resulted was merely
incidental and not unreasonable. Only unreasonable restraints are
prohibited by the Sherman Act. 20 The term restraint of trade had a
Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S.
131 (1936); United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258
U.S. 451 (1922); Radio Corp. v. Lord, 28 F. (2d) 257 (C.C.A.
3d, 1928).
13Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F. (2d) 641 (C.C.A.
7th, 1935) (competition not substantially lessened or monopoly
created).
14United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
'rIbid.
16 United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
L2 International Business Machines

1738 STAT.

731 (1914), 15 u.s.c. §14 (1934).

'a United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).

1n a case decided prior to the First Shoe Machinery Company Case
the Supreme Court said, "Rights conferred by patents are indeed
very definite and extensive, but they do not give any more than
oter rights an universal license against positive prohibitions.
The Sherman Law is a limitation of rights, rights which may
be pushed to evil consequences and therefore restrained." Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912).
That case was cited with approval in a recent case, Carbice Corp.
v. American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931). The cases can
be distinguished on the facts but the language seems clearly
contra to that used in the First Shoe Machinery Company Case.
See the excellent dissenting opinion in United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
2
o Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 498, 499 (1940); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard
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common law mearnng 21 which Congress probably intended to give to
the words in the Act.22 In one case, the Supreme Court held that
where the restriction is not ancillary to a lawful agreement, there can
be no question of reasonableness.23 In another case the Court held
24
that restrictions which are reasonable are not restraints of trade.
Thus the Court has given "reasonable" several distinct meanings
which are used as occasion arises. 25 Price fixing agreements are prohibited by the Act and it does not matter that the prices agreed upon
are reasonable.26 That the restraint was imposed to accomplish what
would have been lawful if done without restraint will not make it a
reasonable restriction.27
The Sherman Act is criminal m part and remedial in part. Much
confusion results from a failure to recognize this distinction. Cases
which arose under the remedial sections of the statute are cited as
authority in criminal prosecutions and conversely. In the principal
case the court said, "Certainly the Government made out a stronger
case m this regard than did the party having the burden of proof"
in two other cases cited. 28 The Government would certainly need
to make out a stronger case to sustain a conviction, since the first
case cited was a suit for injunction by the Government, and the seeOil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54, 55, 58 (1911); United
States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899),
affirmng United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed.
271 (C.C.A. 6th, 1898), Note (1940) 14 TEMP. LQ. 541.
21 United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (C.C.A.,
6th, 1898).
2 2
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Cavers, And
What of the Apex Case Now? (1941) 8 u. CH. L. REV. 516.
23 United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (C.C.A.
6th, 1898); T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 38 (1941).
24United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
25 "We have said that the Sherman Act, as a charter of freedom
has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to
be desirable in constitutional provisions. It does not go into
detailed definitions. Thus in applying its broad prohibitions,
each case demands a close scrstiny of its own facts. Questions
of reasonableness are necessarily questions of relation and degree." Sugar Institute Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600,
(1936) ; Note (1940) 13 so. CAL. . REv. 481, 489 (concerning conflicts between Patent Law and the Sherman Act).
26 United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927);
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912);
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899);
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); cf.
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933)
(an agreement to fix prices when there is no power or intent
to control the market does not violate the Sherman Act); Note
(1941) 16 IND. L. T. 421.
27Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274
U.S. 37 (1927).
28
Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1938); Vitagraph, Inc. v. Perelman, 95 F. (2d) 142 (C.C.A. 3d, 1936, rehea'ng 1938).
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and was a suit for injunction by a private party. A preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict in a civil action. 29 This
is true in civil actions to recover statutory penalties or actions to
recover damages for injury from an act which was also a crime. 30
But to sustain a conviction in a criminal prosecution, there must be
substantial evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.31 ]n so far as
the statute is criminal or penal32 it must be strictly construed.33 In
so far as it is remedial it should be liberally construed.8'
There is a general rule that a criminal statute should be sufficiently certain to enable those included in its terms to know in
advance whether an act is criminal or not.35 But since the indefiniteness of the Sherman Act is due to judicial construction which has
limited liability, defendants should not be allowed to complain.
The alleged violations in the principal case covered some nineteen
years and were open and well known. Other automobile manufacturers were engaged in the same sort of activity. A point not raised,
but one which seems pertinent, is that popular construction of a
statute over a long period of time is significant as to its true meaning.
That such a prosecution is unprecedented shows very strongly
that the public did not consider such activity illegal. 7
The intention of the legislature can be determined from the history of the act or by long continued inaction in the face of judicial
construction after passage. 38 Since Congress has remained inactive
29Louisvile & N. R.R. v. Jones, 83 Ala. 376, 3 So. 902 (1888);
Stearns v. Field, 90 N.Y. 640 (1882).
3
oBrothers v. Home, 140 Ga. 617, 79 S.E. 468 (1913); Thompson
v. Cornwell, 133 Ill. App. 261 (1907); Johnson Service Co. v.
McLernon, 127 N.Y.S. 431, 142 App. Div. 677 (1911). Contra:
McInturff v. Insur. Co. of Amer., 248 Ill. 92, 93 N.E. 369 (1910).
31 Spalitto v. United States, 39 F. (2d) 728 (C.C.A. 8th, 1930);
Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447, 147 So. 897 (1933).
32 A penal statute is one which inflicts punishment and it does not
matter whether that punishment be imposed by civil action or
criminal prosecution. United States v. Choteau, 102 U.S. 603
(1880); Lagler v. Bye, 42 Ind. App. 592, 85 N.E. 36 (1908).
33
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1903)
(must give effect to the intention of the legislature as disclosed by words used); Lagler v. Bye, 42 Ind. App. 592, 85 N.E.
36 (1908) (a strict construction is one included in the words of
the statute); State v. Aetna Banking & Trust Co., 34 Mont. 379,
87 Pac. 268 (1906).
S4A liberal construction is one not excluded by the words of the
statute. Lagler v. Bye, 42 Ind. App. 592, 85 N.E. 36 (1908).

35 Mc~oyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931); Editorial, The Need
of CertaInty zn a Criminal Statute to Make it Constitutional
(1915) 80 CENT. L.3. 289. For statutes which have been held not
too indefinite see, Jay Fox v. State, 236 U.S. 273 (1915); Waters
Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 212 U.S. 86 (1909).
'3 United States v. Farrar, 38 F. (2d) 515 (D. Mass. 1930); State
v. Teahan, 50 Conn. 92 (1882).
37 State v. Rand, 51 N.H. 361 (1871); Horack, cASES AND MATERIALS
oN LEGISLATION (1940) 602.
sgApex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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for nearly half a century, they must have intended the elastic89 construction which the courts have given the act. The purpose of the
Congress in leaving the definitions of the prohibited activity elastic
seems to have been to allow the court wide powers in construing the
Act so it could protect the dominant social interest as it appeared in
any case. 40 As decisions have multiplied,, certain areas of activity
within the scope of the prohibitions of the Sherman Act have become
determinate. Other areas lemain uncertain, because few decisions
or no decisions covering those areas have been made. At times a
case falls in several different areas and the principal case was one."1
39 The word elastic is used as opposed to certain. Goble, Law as a
Science (1933) 9 IND. L.J. 294.
40 Economic consequences are important in determining whether any
given activity is a monopoly prohibited by the Act. Note (1939)
49 YAL L.3T. 284.
41 Each case
continues to be governed largely by its own factual
situation. Note (1940) 18 so. CALIF. L. REV. 481, 489.

